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Abstract
This paper examines the expansion of compulsory schooling in fifteen
Western European countries over the period 1950-2000. We show that a
convergence process of mandatory years of schooling has occurred across
these countries since 1950. We argue that the major driver of this phe-
nomenom is the existence of decreasing aggregate returns to education
that have limited the extension of compulsory schooling. Then we test
whether convergence still holds when confronted with other explanations
described in the literature, which are respectively based on technology
and trade, institutions, and the budget constraint of governments. Con-
ditional convergence does hold and we find that openness has been another
robust determinant of compulsory years of schooling, reflecting the need
of education in an increasingly globalized world.
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1 Introduction
The expansion of compulsory schooling after the Second World War represented
an important reform common to the majority of European countries. Specifi-
cally, over the period 1950-2000, the fifteen Western European countries consid-
ered in this study have extended the school-leaving age by one year or longer.
Interestingly, this change in legislation was undertaken by Nordic, Anglo-Saxon
and Continental countries, which had different traditions and experiences in
educational policy.
Many theories have been proposed in the sociology and political science lit-
erature to explain the expansion of education during this “period of extensive
development of the educational and training system”(Diebolt (1999), p.30). But
these country-level studies are too specific to allow any inference on the common
factors that may have influenced education policies in a similar way. What is
missing in the literature is a comparative analysis of the educational reforms un-
dertaken at the European level. Comparative works by Diebolt and Fontevielle
(2001) and Ringer (1979) represent an attractive start but are not sufficient to
exhibit the factors driving the expansion of compulsory schooling in general.1
Nor do they explain the timing and the magnitude of changes in compulsory
years of schooling that occurred in most European countries after the war.
In contrast, this paper adopts a comparative approach using an original data
set for fifteen European countries over the period 1950-2000, and undertakes a
quantitative analysis of the determinants of changes in compulsory schooling
laws. The major phenomenom we observe in the data is convergence: the
lower mandatory schooling in 1950, the sooner and the larger the change in
the legal age of compulsory schooling. We argue that economic forces promote
convergence of educational systems for two simple reasons: first, the profitability
1The focus of these analyses is limited to a small number of countries: to France and
Germany in the former and to France, Germany and the United Kingdom in the latter.
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of education is decreasing at the margin, second, extending compulsory schooling
has an increasing marginal cost because years of Secondary are more expensive
than years of Primary. In other words, compulsory schooling has decreasing net
aggregate returns that trigger convergence.
Next, we test whether convergence still holds when one controls for other
determinants described in the literature. Some theories have emphasized re-
spectively the effects of trade and technological progress, institutional aspects,
and constraints set on a benevolent State. We do find conditional convergence
as well as evidence supporting some aspects of these theories taken individually.
However, the most robust secondary effect is openness: the more open a country,
the higher compulsory years of schooling. Rising globalization and public in-
vestments into education therefore appear to be complementary phenomenoms
in the postwar Western Europe.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain why we focus on compulsory
rather than actual years of schooling, and we review the origins of educational
laws that have characterised the European experience after the war. We present
the economic motives for convergence and analyse the other theories proposed by
scholars to explain the expansion of education. Then, we describe the dataset,
explain the methodology, and present the results of the empirical analysis. Last
section concludes.
2 Theories of compulsory years of schooling
2.1 Compulsory versus actual years of schooling
In this paper we focus on compulsory rather than on actual years of schooling.
Indeed, actual years of schooling depend on three major factors : the constraint
of the law - mandatory schooling -, as well as costs and benefits of voluntary
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education. A manifold of determinants affect costs and benefits of voluntary
education: its observed return on the labour market, which eventually depends
on heterogeneous unobserved factors, expectations of the latter return, credit
constraints to the family, preferences, the rate of discounting with respect to
intertemporal choices, and so on and so forth.
This paper does not envisage an exhaustive theory of the determinants of
actual education, but rather focuses on one single component, which we believe
an important one, the constraint of the law. Actual years of schooling of the
population can indeed be related to lagged compulsory years of schooling, as this
paper will demonstrate. In which extent this policy variable has been an effective
mean of increasing average education in postwar Europe? A subsequent question
arises naturally: what were the economic, political, demographic forces that
underlied the extension of the school-leaving age? This question is addressed in
details in the following.
2.2 The origin of compulsory schooling
Following the definition provided by the OECD (1983, p.12), compulsory school-
ing is “the span of years during which every normal child must be receiving a
formal education”. Compulsory schooling was introduced in most Western coun-
tries between the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century.2 Economic historians have been interested in the topic
of formal education to understand how institutions can create the conditions
to promote economic development and growth, as in Cipolla (1969), Tortella
(1990) or Sandberg (1982). Interestingly, compulsory schooling was introduced
only at a relatively late stage of industrialization whereas basic human capital,
measured by literacy rates, was already widespread. In fact, the basic skills of
2Maynes (1985, p.25). The exception is represented by Germany. In Prussia compulsory
schooling was introduced in 1763 and extended to the German Empire in 1871.
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reading, writing and arithmetic were provided by a variety of religious and non
religious institutions in Western Europe at this time.
Why was compulsory schooling not institutionalized before the nineteenth
century and only after the beginning of the industrialization process in most
European countries? Mitch (1983) argued that an earlier introduction of com-
pulsory schooling would have been socially desirable but not economically nec-
essary as there was a lack of demand for educated workers. In fact, literate
workers did not benefit from any wage premium with respect to their illiter-
ate counterparts. The shift in demand was probably generated by the greater
complexity of the productive activity, in other words by the acceleration of tech-
nological progress as strongly emphasized by Galor (2006). This would suggest
that schooling became compulsory first in more industrialized countries where
the demand for education was already high. Accordingly to Landes and Solmon
(1972), this is what happened in the United States where the institutionaliza-
tion of schooling may be seen as the formalization of a social change that was
taking place in the American society. Scholars have not reached such a con-
clusion for Europe, although enrolments in primary school were already high
when compulsion was established (see Craig (1981) as well as Morrisson-Murtin
(2008) for quantitative evidence).
In many aspects, the introduction of compulsory schooling in Europe was a
revolutionary policy change, often associated to the process of nation building
as emphasized by Cipolla (1969). It is however important to acknowledge that
the number of years of schooling that was initially made compulsory was very
low, especially in Southern Europe. Moreover attendance was low, especially
in the countryside at harvest time, and the power of the state to enforce it
was limited due to budget constraints. Moreover, the economic depression that
followed the Great War and the slow recovery during the interwar period im-
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posed important constraints on government expenditure for social services such
as public education. In fact, even if governmental intervention increased after
1918, the important increase in public expenditure as a share of GDP between
1913 and 1937 was largely due to the depression rather than a real increase in
public spending for social services (e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000)).
After 1945, with the end of the war, things changed dramatically. Countries
started experiencing unprecedented growth rates and the recovery was faster
than the more optimistic could have expected (Eichengreen, 1996). Moreover,
the new economic and socio-political conditions created the pressure for gov-
ernments to modernize the education system. The expansion of compulsory
schooling was an institutional reconfiguration of the schooling system under-
taken in countries at odds with each other, with dissimilar economic conditions
and different cultural and educational traditions. In addition to the expansion
of education, many countries reshaped their educational system. For instance
the 1970 reform in Spain was the first since the Moyano Act of 1857 to reshape
the entire educational system (EURYDICE, 2005).
In the following paragraphs we will argue that the extension of compulsory
schooling after 1950 was mainly characterized by convergence. We will also
analyse the alternative theories proposed by sociologists and political scientists,
and describe the variables used to compare their relative explanatory power.
2.3 The convergence process
The intuition on which we have based our main argument is very simple: if
education has decreasing aggregate returns, it is relatively more profitable for
a benevolent State to increase compulsory schooling when its current level is
lower. As a result, countries with a low mandatory years of schooling should
catch-up with others everything else equal.
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At the macroeconomic level, the returns to input factors are usually assumed
to be smaller than one. However, the elasticity of human capital could possi-
bly be augmented by the so-called externality of education, possibly leaving
room for increasing returns to human capital. This externality could stem from
technological spillovers, increased social capital such as crime reduction, or bet-
ter institutions in general. However, only small externalities of education have
been found in the literature (see for instance Acemoglu-Angrist (2000), Ciccone
(2005) or Soto (2006)). So it is likely that education has decreasing returns on
the aggregate.
Also, it is clear that providing education has a cost that is a convex function
of the number of years of schooling. Statistics from the OECD (2002) show
that in 1999 the average spending on a pupil in primary is 4229 dollars, versus
5174 dollars in secondary and 11422 dollars in higher education. That is, the
expenditure per student at tertiary level was, in 1999, 2.3 times greater than at
primary level (OECD, 2002, p.145). The reason for a convex cost of schooling
has to do with the production function of knowledge in general. It takes more
and more resources - time, money, and human capital - to achieve a marginal
increase in productive knowledge.
As a sum, the marginal gains from schooling are decreasing and the marginal
cost is increasing with educational development, leading to decreasing net re-
turns to schooling. A simple model, inspired by Skidmore et al. (2004), rational-
izes this. Notice Gt governmental spending in education and ht human capital
derived from compulsory years of schooling that affects the current generation
of children. Let N be the population aged between 0 and 20 and L that aged
between 20 and 60. Both are assumed to be constant over time for simplicity.
Saying that the cost of schooling is convex is equivalent to say that compulsory
units of human capital are a concave function of financial ressources per head3,
3Normally, only the fraction of pupils under the compulsory age of schooling should enter
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namely that
ht =
(
Gt
N
)γ
, γ < 1 (1)
Then, compulsory schooling has a positive impact on total output Yt, but is
subject to decreasing marginal returns. Importantly, reforms conducted on the
current generation of pupils will have a lagged impact, only to manifest when
this generation enters the labour market. Hence,
Yt+1 = AL (ht)
α
, α < 1 (2)
In the latter equation, A is a technological parameter4 possibly country-specific
and time-varying. Full participation of the labour force is assumed.
A budget constraint sets the final stage. Government spending are given by
Gt = τYt (3)
where τ is the tax rate, which can vary across countries and across time5. Then,
equations (1-3) bring together
ht+1 =
(
τAL (ht)
α
N
)γ
(4)
equation (1). But as the State also subsidies non-compulsory schooling, the fraction of young
people below 20 is a more realistic denominator. It captures the fact that only a fraction of
total educational expenditures is devoted to compulsory schooling.
4Human capital could enter the above equation through the technological parameter as in
the Schumpeterian theory. This would complicate the exposure but not necessarily alter the
result. Indeed, if the growth rate of technology was a function of human capital, then A would
depend on all past stocks of human capital. This does not preclude convergence, but simply
introduces a degree of time dependence strictly larger than one.
5Barro (1990) gives a theoretical justification for the fact that the tax rate does not depend
on the stage of development and should remain constant over time. A vast and unconclusive
literature examines the empirical validity of the latter assumption, assessing whether gov-
ernment spending increases or remains a constant share of GDP in the course of economic
development.
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Taking logs leads to
log ht+1 = γ log
(
τAL
N
)
+ γα log(ht) (5)
Hence both decreasing marginal returns (α < 1) and convex cost of schooling
(γ < 1) generate convergence in compulsory human capital.
Last, the compulsory stock of human capital can be related to compulsory
years of schooling using the usual Mincerian transformation. Assuming for
simplicity a constant return to schooling over time ht = exp(rSt) where r is the
return to schooling and St compulsory years of schooling, we obtain
St+1 =
γ
r
log
(
τAL
N
)
+ γαSt (6)
This equation is the basic one that will be tested empirically in a following sec-
tion6. Admittedly, this model is simplistic as it rules out various institutional
features such as the balance of power between different classes of policy makers
- for instance in the model τ is kept exogenous. However, it has the virtue
of offering a comprehensive framework to understand the two main motives of
educational systems convergence, namely the decreasing marginal gains from
schooling and its convex cost. Also, it sheds light upon some other major mech-
anisms that might interfere: for instance, the technology A, the tax rate τ and
the demographic structure captured by L/N might vary across time and across
countries. Last, considering what will come out from the empirical analysis, this
model appears to be completely sufficient on its own. In the next subsection, we
6Possibly the return to compulsory years of schooling differs from the Mincer return to
schooling, as many non-linearities are associated to certain degrees as demonstrated by Heck-
man et al. (2005). We rule out this problem for the sake of simplicity. Also, the Mincer return
to schooling r can vary over time. Consequently the autoregressive coefficient γα should rather
be equal to γαrt−1/rt. The magnitude of the ratio of returns should however be very close to
one in contemporary European countries as we will consider time spans of 5 or 10 years latter
on.
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describe the three latter economic, political and demographic forces that might
affect compulsory schooling in addition to the convergence effect.
2.4 Other determinants
We review hereafter the various factors that could have had an impact on the
implementation of compulsory schooling. We have classified them into three
different categories: technological and trade factors, political ones, and those
relative to the budget constraint of the state.
2.4.1 Technological factors
According to this theory, technological advance and greater complexity of the
organization of production creates the demand for a more educated labour force.
According to Collins (1971), this happens when the proportion of jobs requiring
more educated workers increases. This mechanism certainly makes sense on the
long-term. For instance, Galor (2006) suggests that fierce economic competition
between England and its continental challengers Prussia and France led the
British government to provision universal education for the first time in the
Educational Act of 1870 in order to increase its industrial productivity. In the
“race between education and technological progress”, states can indeed increase
the number of years of compulsory schooling in order to facilitate the adoption
of new technologies.
This phenomenom is certainly reinforced by trade and globalization. Hecksher-
Ohlin theory states that openness should have a Ricardian effect on the economies,
which should invest in the sector that defines their comparative advantage. Be-
cause it augments the demand for technology-intensive products in industrial
Western European countries, a rising globalization can reinforce the incentive
to educate the workforce in order to deal with fast technological progress. So
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openness should have a positive effect on education in industrial countries where
the former complementarity between education and technology is crucial to the
economy.
2.4.2 Political economy mechanisms
This theory has been developed in order to address the unanswered questions
left by the latter theory, in particular that the expansion of education goes
beyond the experience of rich and developed countries. In the context of the
European expansion of compulsory schooling, countries at different stages of
development, with dissimilar levels of GDP per capita and technology, have
enacted the school-leaving age laws and increased compulsory education.
The common history of European countries is characterized by important
socio-political factors that may have been influential for the expansion of com-
pulsory schooling after the 1950s. Among these, the process of European in-
tegration may have played a central role. Because harmonization of the legal
systems across countries may affect the dynamics of convergence, we expect the
membership to the European Union7 to interfere with convergence. Similarly,
the expectation of becoming a member of the EU may have led countries to
modernize the educational system in order to catch-up with the educational
leaders8.
Another factor that may have affected the expansion of compulsory school-
ing is democracy. The majority of European countries already had democratic
institutions at the beginning of the study period, 1950. However, the West-
7In the following we will refer to the European Union as the EU even if historically the
Union has changed of name.
8Indeed, there was a consistent lag between the year of application and when new members
joined the European Union. Ireland for instance, applied in 1961 and joined the European
Union in 1971 whereas Portugal and Spain were admitted in 1986 after applying in 1977.
During these time periods both Ireland and Portugal enacted school-leaving age laws. In
Greece, the application was submitted when the democratic regime was restored in 1975.
Many educational reforms that had been invalidated during the regime were re-established
(see Kurian (1988)) and the country could become member of the European Union in 1981.
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ern European countries that experienced the greatest expansion of compulsory
schooling did not have a democratic regime before.9 Lindert (2004) has argued
that the spread of democracy increased enrolments at primary and secondary
levels rather than the opposite10
Last political variable worth analyzing is the tax rate in equation (6), and
more generally inequality. In general, Sokoloff-Engerman (2000) or Galor et
al. (2006) argue that the degree of implementation of education reforms is an
outcome of the balance of power in society; the latter authors provide indeed
historical evidence in support of the inverse relationship between land inequality
and investments in human capital. In that context, higher inequality should
entail lower compulsory schooling. However, in the context of democracies with
well-functionning and pro-growth institutions, inequality might well have the
opposite effect. Indeed, benevolent governments might well be keen on reducing
the gap between the most and least educated workers, especially in the context
of a rising globalization and skill-bias technological change. Rising inequality
across educational groups could then entail increasing compulsory schooling.
2.4.3 The budget constraint of the government
In this framework the timing of the enactment of laws on school-leaving age is
not considered as a result of post-war economic and socio-political conditions,
but rather as a function of the state’s capacity to support the expansion of edu-
cation. Consequently, strong states that emerged at the end of the Second World
9This is the case of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal. In 1974 “the Regime of the Colonels”
ended in Greece and the Carnation Revolution put an end to Salazar’s regime in Portugal.
On the other hand, in 1975, the authoritarian regime ended in Spain with Franco’s death. In
Italy for instance, radical school reforms were undertaken as a result of the fall of fascism and
in Greece as well, when the military dictatorship ended, many schooling policy changes were
undertaken.
10The direction of causality between democracy and human capital is nevertheless much
debated in the literature, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Glaeser et al. (2006). But
it is true that the idea of some visionary dictators boosting education in postwar Europe is
clearly counter-factual to the experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain.
12
War had the possibility to devote resources to education and to expand the level
of compulsory schooling with the belief that “sustained economic growth needed
an increasingly skilled manpower” as quoted from Demeulemeester and Diebolt
(2005).
One important factor of the strength of the state is its capacity to reform,
which depends on its budget. Expanding education imposes a high cost on the
government budget, which will be easier to bear during periods of fast growth.
Following this reasoning it seems plausible to assume that growth of GDP per
capita will be a determinant of compulsory schooling. For instance, from the
aftermath of the Second World War until the end of the Golden Age, there has
been a positive correlation between GDP growth and expenditure on education
as Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) have illustrated.11.
Reciprocally, the share of illiterate people in the population gives an in-
dication of the burden faced by governments.12 It proxies the importance of
dropouts and enforcement difficulties. A further factor affecting the cost of
public education derives from the demographic composition of the labour force,
and is determined by the demographic ratio of active population (aged 15-64)
divided by young population (aged 0-14). This is central to the “population
ecology hypothesis”from Craig (1981). It is related to the ability of countries
to support the expansion of education when the share of the active labour force
grows faster than the schooling-age population. This factor arises naturally
from equation (6) via the ratio L/N . A last factor should be considered. Ur-
banization is expected to have a positive impact on the expansion of compulsory
schooling as it enables countries to realize economies of scale. Also,the greater
11The reason for not having chosen a variable more strictly related to education such as
expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP is that this variable would depend on the
business cycle and would be contaminated by any other mechanisms affecting GDP such as
the post-oil shock long term economic slowdown.
12For Portugal and Italy who displayed respectively 3 and 5 years of compulsory years in
1950, there is a risk of reverse causality: a low level of mandatory schooling could have created
illiterate people in the early 50s.
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complexity of the economic activity in urban areas is likely to create the demand
for more educated workers.
3 The data
In this section we describe extensively the dependent variable, mandatory years
of schooling, and we exhibit its relationships with actual years of schooling.
We find a significant and robust relationship that justifies why it is relevant
to consider it as a public policy variable. Then we illustrate the convergence
process associated to it, and we depict the explanatory variables mentioned
above.
3.1 Compulsory years of schooling
Table 1 describes the occurence of the reform in Europe after World War II.
Two groups of countries can be identified according to the starting level of
compulsory schooling at the end of the Second World War. Austria, Belgium,
France, Switzerland, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries
started with high levels of compulsory schooling, varying from 7 to 9 years.
On the other hand, Southern European countries had lower initial levels of
compulsory schooling, from 3 years for Portugal to 5 for Italy and 6 for Greece.
This distinction was reflected in the actual levels of schooling achieved by the
population.
Southern European countries have increased the number of years of com-
pulsory schooling more than the other countries since 1945. They achieved a
significant catch-up. Spain and Italy increased compulsory schooling twice and
the overall change consisted of 3 and 4 additional years of compulsory schooling.
Portugal is the European country that has had the largest increase of compul-
sory schooling since 1945. According to Alves and Cana´rio (2002, p.656), since
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the end of the war “schooling has become the primary focus”.
On the other hand, Nordic countries and other countries that started with
higher levels of compulsory schooling increased the school-leaving age by a year
or two. The experience of the United Kingdom is an exception. A education
act was already passed by Parliament in 1939 to raise the school-leaving age by
one year. However, the law was suspended because of the outbreak of the Sec-
ond World War (see Kurian (1988)). A plan to increase compulsory schooling
was included in the 1944 Butler Act but did not become effective until 1947
(Dent, 1954). The case of the Netherlands deserves a comment. In fact, after
the first legislation making education compulsory was passed in 1900, the Act
was amended several times but a new legislation replacing it was provided only
in 1950 and after in 1971 with the implementation of the “Leerplichtwet”, the
Compulsory Education Act. For many countries this change was the result of a
reconfiguration of the education system that was perceived as necessary by gov-
ernments during the postwar period. In Austria, for example, after the Second
World War “educational reform became one of the major issues facing the new
republic”as quoted from Kurian (1988, p.8). However, the school-leaving age
law did not pass until 1962 because of the divergent education policies between
the Austrian Socialist Party and the Austrian People’s Party, the two largest
parties. Also, in France there was a great need for reforms after the war and
the policy change in compulsory schooling was undertaken under the Pleven
government. In Spain the need for reform was not addressed under Franco’s au-
thoritarian regime before 1970 when the Ley General de Educacio´n was enacted
(Marlow-Ferguson, 2002, p.1272).
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3.2 Compulsory and actual years of schooling
Hereafter we present the relationships between compulsory and actual years
of schooling. From an empirical perspective, it would be useful to track the
evolution of education by age cohort following the implementation of new laws
and the extension of the school-leaving age. It would reveal in which extent
was the constraint binding for the relevant cohorts of age. Unfortunately, there
does not exist such data on education by cohort of age. However, it is possible
to relate actual and lagged compulsory schooling among the whole population.
Table 2 displays a fixed-effects panel data estimation conducted on our sample
of 15 Western European countries, with average years of Primary and Secondary
schooling in the population older than 15 as a dependent variable, and lagged
compulsory years of schooling as explanatory variables. Data on actual years of
Primary and Secondary schooling are adapted from Cohen-Soto (2007)13.
We consider the population older than 15 and retain a sizeable time interval
between actual and compulsory schooling, which is however limited to 40 years
because of data availability. As compulsory schooling evolves slowly over time,
introducing all past lags may cause multicolinearity problems. Also, favouring
long-distant lags over more recent ones is likely to improve the exogeneity of
regressors - admittedly, finding an instrument for compulsory years of schooling
is out of the scope of this paper, but we do control for fixed-effects. So in all
regressions we exclude the first lag, as well as the third one in some regressions
in order to diminish the correlation between regressors. Time dummies are also
introduced in order to control for modifications of the age structure and the
overall extension of life expectancy that affects the average stock of years of
schooling.
13In order to deal with different durations or Primary and Secondary across countries, the
latter were redefined as respectively the first six years of school and the following 6 years. For
instance, the last year of Secondary in Italy, which has a total of 13 years of Primary and
Secondary schooling, is reclassified as Higher Education and is not taken into account.
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With three time periods (1990, 2000, 2010) in columns I and IV, all the
lags are always significant. With only two time periods (1990 and 2000) in
columns II and V, only the fourth lag is always significant. So changes in actual
education between 1990 and 2010 are consistently correlated with changes in
compulsory schooling between 1950 and 1970. As the median age in European
countries was roughly comprised between 30 and 40 in 2000, focusing on a
40 years lag makes perfectly sense. Interestingly, had compulsory schooling
followed rather than entailed the rise in schooling enrolment, then more recent
lags and even contemporary compulsory schooling would most likely correlate
with actual schooling. However, this is not the case as shown by columns III
and VI.
So the increase in compulsory schooling 40 years ago is a robust determinant
of current changes in actual average schooling in the population. This conferes
a true public policy dimension to the former variable. We are now ready to
investigate the following issues: why did Southern European countries catch-up
with the rest of Europe in terms of compulsory schooling? what were the other
factors that promoted or undermined convergence?
3.3 Convergence of compulsory years of schooling
In order to adopt a general perspective on the data, we now treat the sample as
a whole. Figure 1 depicts all occurrences of a schooling reform regardless of the
country. It makes visible that overall the pace of reforms has been more intense
during the period 1951-1975, with 16 reforms versus 9 afterwards14. Both mix
economically advanced countries and less developed countries such as Greece,
Portugal, Spain and Italy. Seven countries have had multiple increases (Ireland,
Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Norway), spaced in time
14For Portugal the men and women reforms taking place in respectively 1956 and 1960 have
been counted as a single reform taking place in 1956.
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from 20 years in most cases, with three notable exceptions (Greece in 1964,
1967 and 1976, the Netherlands in 1971-1975 and Portugal in 1956-1964).
Figure 2 is the core of the paper. It shows the variation in the number of
mandatory years of schooling over the period 1950-2000 with respect to initial
mandatory years. There is a clear negative correlation: the lower the initial
compulsory years, the larger the increase in compulsory schooling. This conver-
gence process, also called the “beta-convergence” in Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1995), depicts the impact of the initial value on the growth rate of mandatory
years of schooling. It is not necessarily linked to the convergence of the distri-
bution of mandatory years of schooling towards a common mean, the “sigma-
convergence”. Stationarity of unobserved factors is required for the first type of
convergence to imply the second.
Figure 3 depicts the standard error of the distribution of mandatory years of
schooling over the period 1950-2000 with respect to its annual average (there are
21 points as 21 years of reforms). It is clear that the dispersion of this variable
has decreased with the overall increase of compulsory schooling. Hence we do
validate the “sigma-convergence” hypothesis as well.
3.4 Other explanatory variables
We now detail and describe succintly the other explanatory variables associated
to the above theories15. Table 3 presents their averages and standard errors
over the whole period and the two sub-periods.
The first set of variables is relative to technology and trade: we first consider
technology per capitameasured as the number of patents granted to residents and
non-residents divided by the population, smoothed with the help of a moving
average filter over the past 10 years (over the past 5 years for the period 1951-
15please refer to the appendix for the discussion of the construction of two variables, tech-
nology and democracy.
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1955); one expects to find a positive coefficient for this variable as the higher
the level of technology the greater would be the complementarity between tech-
nology and schooling. Second, openness, calculated as the sum of exports and
imports divided by GDP. As the considered countries were relatively advanced
industrial ones by international standards, we expect openness to have a pos-
itive effect as it might increase the price of technology-intensive products. In
that regard, human capital would be a key factor of production. It turns out
that technology per capita has increased by 25% across the two sub-periods and
openness by a dramatic 73%, these increases being two characteristics of the
globalization era.
The second set of regressors concerns the political economy mechanisms.
Interestingly, the index for democracy is greater in the second period - see details
on the construction of the variable in annex. As previously suggested countries
like Greece, Portugal and Spain did not have a “strongly democratic regime”
in the years following the end of the Second World War. Further on, the Gini
coefficient has decreased by nearly 7 percent since 1975. The Gini was retained
to capture the effect of inequality and the balance of power within the society.
Statistics show a large decrease of inequality in the second half of the period. As
shown by Morrisson-Murtin (2005), market income inequality has been reduced
among a majority of European countries between 1970 and the mid-80s, while
increased redistributive fiscality has partly compensated the increasing market
inequality after the mid-80s.
Among the variables taken from the third theory, growth in GDP per capita
was significantly greater before 1975, this decrease being clearly due to the
slowdown that followed the Golden Age. The demographic ratio reflects the
population ageing effect following the Baby-boom of the 1950s. That is, after
1975, the ratio increases and this is revealing of the growth in the working age
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population with respect to the schooling age one. Urbanization increases by 15
percent and this is due to the economic expansion of cities. Also, socio-economic
trends, cultural traditions and constraints as the attractiveness of urban areas
and the application of planning policies have fostered the development of urban
areas (see for instance European Environment Agency (2006), p.7, and Lever
(1999) p.234). Illiteracy has been cut by 2 to reach 2.7% in the second sub-
period.
4 Econometric analysis
4.1 The model
First, we discuss the statistical model. There are two approaches: one is to
model explicitely the lapse of time between two reforms, the other is to model
the intensity of the reform, namely the number of mandatory years that have
been passed in the new law. The first strategy uses duration analysis, the second
one relies on a classical linear analysis. We explain briefly why we chose the
second approach.
Duration analysis models the timing of a given event.16 In our case, changes
can occur many times and the duration since last change, as well as the total
number of changes in the past, have clearly an influence on the likelihood of a
current change, in other words, there is some time-dependency. A logit-probit
approach cannot capture it, because it would assume independence between
various occurences conditionnally on covariates. The use of a duration model
16For instance, Fishback and Kantor (1998; 2000) used this methodology in order to study
the passage of the Workers’ Compensation Laws in the United States. Also, Box-Steffensmeier
and Zorn (1998) used the Cox parametric approach in order to study the pattern of retirement
among the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court over the period 1789-1993. Alternatively, if one
were interested in modelling the date a law is passed rather than the duration until this law
has been passed, a logit-probit approach could also be adopted. For instance, Chen (2001)
used a discrete-time logit model in order to study the determinants of the passage of the State
Fair Employment Legislation in the American states over the period 1945-64.
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with multiple-spells can account for this problem since it explicitely models
the lapse of time between the successive changes of the law. However, this
framework has a major drawback: it neglects the intensity of the change. As
described above, more than half of the reforms entail an increase of 2, 3 and
even 4 years, which must be taken into account. Consequently, we run a classical
linear analysis where the actual mandatory years of schooling is the dependent
variable.17
In the former section we have heavily stressed the convergence process occur-
ring over the period. The natural framework is consequently a dynamic linear
panel model with an autoregressive component of order one, which can be es-
timated either with Arellano-Bond (1991) or Blundell-Bond (1998) procedures.
Formally, the model for a country i at date t is
yi,t = µ+ δt + bi + ρyi,t−T + Zi,tβ + ui,t (7)
where µ is a grand mean, δt period dummies, bi country dummies, Z a matrix
of potentially endogeneous regressors, ui,t iid residuals, T the delay between the
two considered periods. In this general framework, convergence is captured by
the autoregressive term ρyi,t−T .18 Covariates Zi,t reflect the influence of other
factors such as technology, openness, democracy and so forth.
Two econometric problems are likely to arise. First, measurement errors
may affect some of the regressors, biasing their coefficient towards 0. For this
reason, we have smoothed some erratic variables - technology per capita and
17The use of such a model raises the issue of the interpretation of the dependent variable:
one should rather talk about a score in mandatory schooling, since in the model the dependent
variable takes continuous values but is discrete in reality. For the sake of simplicity we make
the approximation that both variables are equal and keep on using the mandatory years of
schooling as the dependent variable.
18ρ measures the degree of autocorrelation of the process: the lower it is, the faster the
return to the “mean”. Importantly, accounting for other variables, including unobserved
ones, can have a dramatic effect on estimates of the speed of convergence if those variables
are correlated with the lagged dependent variable. In particular, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity removes any omitted variables bias that could affect estimates of ρ
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growth of GDP per capita - by using a moving average procedure with two
different time spans, 5 and 10 years. We also examine convergence with those
two different time spans. Second, there has been a controversy in the conver-
gence literature on the use of Arellano-Bond (1991) and Blundell-Bond (1998)
estimators, which are respectively called “DIF-GMM” and “SYS-GMM”. This
econometric problem is linked to the quality of instruments (some lags of the
dependant variable) used in the procedure DIF-GMM. If those instruments are
weakly correlated with the regressors, estimates may be biased towards 0. In the
case of the convergence estimates, this turns out to overestimate the speed of
convergence. On the other hand, SYS-GMMmakes another assumption, namely
stationnarity of the initial variable. For this reason, we have to investigate the
results given by both DIF-GMM and SYS-GMM.
4.2 Results
Table 3 reports estimates from a simple dynamic panel model with fixed-effects
using the two time spans and the two estimators described above. We used the
xtabond2 Stata version of the latter estimators provided by Roodman (2006).
We applied the two-steps procedures that correct for a non-trivial covariance
matrix, using the Windmeijer (2005) correction of downward biased standard
errors in finite samples.
We report the coefficient of lagged mandatory years of schooling, as well as
the implied annual convergence rate in order to ease comparisons across time
spans. This rate λ follows from the dynamics of convergence19 and is simply
defined as:
λ = − 1
T
log(ρˆ)
where ρˆ is the estimated autoregressive coefficient. We find that the annual
19If yt is the dependent variable, then convergence states that ∆yt = −λyt or equivalently
that yt+T = yt exp(−λT ) = ρyt.
22
convergence rates are respectively equal to 14.9% and 3.7% for DIF-GMM and
SYS-GMM with a 5 years time span, and respectively equal to 9.2% and 2.5%
with a 10 years time span20. In tune with the convergence literature, SYS-
GMM delivers much smaller convergence rates: presumably, lagged levels of the
dependent variable are weak instruments of its first differences when the process
is close to an unit root, biasing the estimates of ρ towards zero in DIF-GMM.
Besides, we report in each case the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests and
the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions. The latter is robust to het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals, contrary to the usual Sargan
test. However, it can be weakened when there are two many instruments. For
this reason, we restricted the set of instruments to the single second lag of the
dependent variable, sticking to the practical rule of thumb of having less instru-
ments than countries. As expected, in any case the first-order autocorrelation
test conducted on first-differenced residuals rejects the null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation, and accepts it at the second-order. Those two results jointly
indicate the absence of autocorrelation in the levels of residuals. Then, all the
Hansen tests accept the null hypothesis of exogeneous regressors as a group,
with p-values avoiding the suspiscious subsets of either too low or two high
values.
As a result, we find that SYS-GMM provide more trustworthy estimates,
with comparable estimates across the two time spans. The lower p-value of the
Hansen J-test with a 10 rather than a 5 years time span, together with the idea
of maximizing the number of observations, lead us to choose SYS-GMM with a
5 years time span as a benchmark procedure.
In table 5 we test for conditional convergence conditionally on each of the
three sets of variables. As before we used the two-steps SYS-GMM with ro-
20Implied annual rates of convergence should be compared across estimators but not across
different different time spans as the latter entail a non-linear mapping between ρ and λ.
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bust standard errors, a 5 years time-span, and the second lags of the dependent
variable (both in level and in difference) as a single instrument. All regressions
passed the specifications tests. The results show that the effect of convergence
is significant and positive in each case. Openness is positive and significant,
showing the positive impact of globalization. In the political economy frame-
work only the democracy index is significant at 10% level. It certainly captures
the negative impact of dictatorships on education in Southern European coun-
tries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece. Surprisingly, the membership of the
European Union, or the expectation of becoming a member, has no effect on
the speed of convergence. We find the same absence of effect when introducing
simple dummies for membership or application to the Union rather than the
interaction between those dummies and the lagged variable. This might be ex-
plained by the relative homogeneity of the sample in the postwar period. Also,
the Gini coefficient was negative and almost significant at a 10% level, but still
above this confidence level. In contrast with the literature on the introduction of
compulsory schooling towards the end of the 19th century in Europe, inequality
does not have a significant impact on the increase in school-leaving age after
the war. In the government’s budget set of variables, the urbanization rate is
significant with the expected sign. Surprisingly, the demographic ratio did to
come out as a significant determinant of compulsory schooling.
The last regression21 shows the results of testing convergence while including
all of the former significant variables. This aims at determining which factors
remain significant when different theories are tested alltogether. It turns out
that only two variables remain significant: the convergence effect, and openness.
A clearer picture emerges: in the immediate postwar period, there has been a
catch-up process from the less advanced countries. In the meantime, globaliza-
21Due to small sample size, it was not possible to conduct further analysis on various sub-
samples or sub-periods.
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tion forces have gained strength and increasingly fostered public investments
into education. More open countries were more likely to enhance compulsory
schooling. It is indeed striking that the two countries the most endowed with
compulsory years of schooling in 2000, Belgium and Netherlands, were the most
open countries in Europe at the same date, together with Ireland which reformed
its system in 2000.
The link between globalization and education has received some attention
in the literature (see for instance Bloom (2004) or Green (2000)), but little
quantification as achieved in this paper. Admittedly, the motives behind the
political will of increasing compulsory schooling in open countries remain some-
what obscure: policy makers might aim at strengthening the skills of the overall
workforce in a global market; alternatively, they may be keen on reducing ten-
sions linked to inequality by raising the educational level of the least educated;
they could seek both goals simultaneously. This question is left aside for future
research. However, the convergence effect might certainly leave less and less
room for public intervention as compulsory years of schooling in Western Eu-
rope have already reached high levels of compulsory schooling by international
and historical standards.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed the determinants of the number of years of compulsory
schooling in fifteen Western European countries since 1950, whereas previous
analyses have mainly focused on single country experiences. Also, we have used
an analytical approach rather than the descriptive approach of the majority of
the existing studies. In order to examine the factors that led to the expansion
of compulsory schooling, we have proposed and validated an explanation based
on convergence forces inherent to decreasing aggregate returns to schooling, and
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tested the explanatory power of other explanations extracted from the sociology
and political science literatures. Empirically, we have assembled a dataset by
using a variety of national and international sources.
Some robust evidence supports the view that convergence has been the major
phenomenom characterizing the evolution of compulsory schooling after 1950.
Because education has decreasing returns, it has been relatively more valuable
for countries with a low educational level to extend compulsory schooling and to
catch-up with more advanced ones. This is still true when one controls for the
various explanations that have been provided in the literature. Hence both ab-
solute and conditional convergence holds. A second robust explanatory variable
is openness. Rising globalization has fostered the enhancement of compulsory
schooling, as the latter both increases the competitivity of the workforce in
a global market and reduces inequality between the most and least educated
within a society. Regarding future work, the extension of the analysis to the
whole twentieth century is a promising direction. Statistical robustness will
be increased, and the validity of the latter effects will be examined since the
introduction of universal education.
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Appendix
A Variables
• Technology per capita:22has been constructed as the number of patents
granted to residents and non-residents at a given year. The choice of this
variable to measure technology is motivated by the state-of-the-art litera-
ture. In fact, many scholars such as Griliches (1986, 1990), Evenson (1984)
and Eaton and Kortum (1996; 1998) have shown both advantages and dis-
advantages in the use of this indicators as a proxy for technology. These
authors have also shown that other measures such as the level of scientific
publication, R&D expenditure and performance in the high-technology
industrial sector do not seem to work better. Patents remain, as Stern
et al. (2000, p.18) say, “the most concrete and comparable measure [of
overall technological performance] across countries and time”. The choice
of patents granted to both residents and non-residents is motivated by
data availability. Data for residents only are not available for the whole
period 1950-2000. To take into account a possible bias that could arise by
considering patents granted to non-residents and therefore introducing a
correlation between this variable and openness we have run the regression
with the number of patents granted to residents only for 1970-2000. There
is virtually no difference in running the regression with the two measures
of technology. This may be motivated by the fact that the fifteen Eu-
ropean countries under study do not have a very high share of patents
granted to foreigners. Therefore, it seems reasonable to extend the use of
this measure to the entire period.
• Democracy : It is an index that measures the level of democracy by con-
sidering characteristics such as the existence of competitive and open elec-
tions, human rights protection, limitations on power holders. It has been
taken from Marshall and Jaggers (2000) and Meyer and Schofer (2005a)
from whom we have received these data. It can take a value from -10
(“strongly autocratic regime”) to +10 (“strongly democratic regime”). It
seems to be a better indicator than the dummy variable that is commonly
used in the literature and that takes the value of “1” if there is a demo-
cratic regime and “0” otherwise. For it allows the analysis of the more
subtle differences that characterize different democratic regimes.
22This variable has been smoothed by using 5-year moving average.
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B Tables
Table 1 - The Extension of Compulsory Schooling in Europe 1938-20001
Country Years in 1938 Date of Reform Years After Starting Age Change
Austria 8 1962 9 6 +1
Belgium2 8 1983 12 6 +4
Denmark 7 1971 9 7 +2
Finland3 6 1977 9 7 +3
France 8 1967 10 6 +2
Greece 6 1964 9 6 +3
1967 6 -3
1976 9 +3
Ireland 8 1972 9 6 +1
2000 10 +1
Italy4 5 1963 8 6 +3
1999 9 +1
Netherlands5 6 1950 8 7 +2
1971 9 +1
1975 10 +1
1985 12 5 +1.5 (on avg)
Norway 7 1969 9 6 +2
1997 10 +1
Portugal 3 1956 (men) 4 6 +1
3 1960 (women) 4
1964 (all) 6 +2
1986 (all) 9 +3
Spain 7 1970 8 6 +1
1990 10 +2
Sweden6 8 1962 9 7 +1
Switzerland7 8 1970 9 5 or 6 +1
United Kingdom8 9 1947 10 5 +1
1973 11 +1
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Notes on Table 1:
1 The dates considered refer to the enactment of the school-leaving age law, that is to
say when compulsory schooling was increased, enforcement was effective and education was
provided at virtually no private cost
2The reform was adopted in the three Communities. Compulsory schooling is full-time until
15 (at 16 only if the student is 15 and has not been enrolled in the first two years of secondary
school), after it is part-time until 18
3For countries where the reform was implemented more gradually the date of change con-
sidered is the year when the compulsory schooling law started being implemented. These
countries are Finland, Sweden (see note below) and Switzerland
4Information have been extracted from Shavit and Westerbeek (1998) and Brandolini and
Cipollone (2002)
5The 1985 reform has led to a change in the school starting age. School starts the first month
after children turn 5 and full-time education is compulsory until students have attended 12
complete years of schooling, in any case until the end of the school year when they turn 16;
then students are required to take one year part-time courses. Therefore, on average, the 1985
change implied a 1.5 increase. Before this reform students started school at the beginning of
the academic year when they turned 7. Information on the Dutch reforms has been kindly
provided by Pr Oosterbeek, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Dr Webbink, Centraal Planbureau
and Eurydice (2005)
6It is acknowledged that in some municipalities compulsory schooling lasted 7 years before
the change. This policy change is known as the ”1950 Education Reform” was gradually
implemented across municipalities over 1949-62 and the legislation passed in 1962. Here, the
starting point is 1950 as the reform was implemented in the second half of 1949 and only 1.3%
of the municipalities had adopted the change in 1949 (Meghir and Palme, 2005, table 1)
7This reform corresponds to the first implementation of the policy change undertaken in the
country. Differences exist across Cantons
8The first reform was implemented in England and Wales in 1947, in Scotland in 1946 and in
Northern Ireland in 1957
Source: Arnet (2000), Eurydice Database on Education (2006), Flora et al. (1987), Marlow-
Ferguson (2002)
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics
1950-2000 1950-1975 1976-2000
Technological Theory
Technology per capita 0.68
(0.57)
0.60
(0.53)
0.75
(0.59)
Openness 49.83
(27.27)
36.52
(18.55)
63.13
(28.12)
Share of population in agriculture 15.12
(12.14)
21.48
(13.29)
8.76
(6.14)
Share of population in industry 33.73
(6.82)
36.82
(7.08)
30.65
(4.89)
Political Economy Theory
Democracy index 8.17
(4.82)
6.80
(6.31)
9.53
(1.71)
Gini 32.99
(6.81)
34.19
(7.43)
31.80
(5.90)
Role of the State Theory
Growth of GDP per capita 0.03
(0.02)
0.04
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
Demographic ratio 2.89
(0.65)
2.43
(0.35)
3.35
(0.55)
Urbanization rate 65.10
(16.32)
60.51
(17.17)
69.68
(14.01)
Illiteracy rate 4.32
(7.28)
5.97
(9.34)
2.67
(3.67)
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Table 4 - Absolute Convergence of Mandatory Years of Schooling in Europe
1950-2000
DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
5 years span 10 years span 5 years span 10 years span
ρ 0.50
(0.16)
∗∗∗ 0.45
(0.13)
∗∗∗ 0.83
(0.07)
∗∗∗ 0.78
(0.07)
∗∗
Impliedλ
(in percents)
14.9 9.2 3.7 2.5
Nb of instruments 9 7 16 11
AB AR(1) p-value 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
AB AR(2) p-value 0.40 0.84 0.50 0.68
Hansen J-Test p-value 0.33 0.17 0.55 0.21
note: AB AR(i) stands for Arellano-Bond test of serial correlation of order i for
first-differenced residuals.
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Figure 1: Variations of Mandatory Years of Schooling in Europe 1950-2000
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Figure 2: Beta-Convergence in the Mandatory Years of Schooling in Europe
1950-2000
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1950-2000
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